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Abstract
This Essay examines the specific conditions and motives that led to the establishment of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (‘Tribunal‘ or ‘ICTY‘), its features as
both a legal and a political institution, and the role of the ICTY in the development of international
criminal adjudication. First, this article discusses the establishment of the ICTY. Second, this
article discusses the role of the ICTY as a political and legal institution. Third, this article explores
the role of the ICTY in the development of international criminal adjudication. Finally, this article
evaluates the results of the ICTY to date.
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I. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ICTY
Just a few years ago, the idea of the establishment of an in-
ternational war crimes tribunal seemed noble yet unrealistic,
and the possibility of its realization very distant. Today we have
ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, and the
process of the establishment of a permanent international crimi-
nal court (or "ICC") has advanced considerably. Why has there
been such a change in so short a time? What future develop-
ments in this area are to be expected? This Essay examines the
specific conditions and motives that led to the establishment of
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia'
("Tribunal" or "ICTY"), its features as both a legal and a political
institution, and the role of the ICTY in the development of inter-
national criminal adjudication.
In order to understand the emergence of the ICTY, it is nec-
essary to put it into historical and political context. 2 It has been
said that the states and nations of southeast Europe are bur-
dened by historical divisions and an ethnic patchwork that has
led to the area becoming a living case study for the "clash of
civilizations" thesis. Indeed, living within a relatively small area
are several national groups, the adherents of three major reli-
gions, diverse cultures, as well as differing levels of economic de-
velopment and political tradition. In spite of this, southeast Eu-
rope is not necessarily condemned to conflict any more so than
the rest of the Old Continent. Its emergence as the primary Eu-
ropean security issue at the end of the twentieth century can be
* Permanent Representative of the Republic of Croatia to the United Nations in
New York; Professor of Law at the University of Zagreb.
1. The Security Council resolution on its establishment named the new court the
International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Viola-
tions of International Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, see S.C.
Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993) [here-
inafter ICTY Statute].
2. For more extensive information, see I. Simonovic & I. Nimac, Stabilizing South-
east Europe, 5 CROATIAN INT'L REL. REV. No. 15 (1999).
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attributed to the co-terminous incidence of several events, most
notably the rise of nationalism in the Socialist Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia (or "SFRY') at the time when communist rule
came to an end, and the security vacuum that arose at the end of
the Cold War.
The conflict that began to spread through southeast Europe
at the beginning of the 1990s, while having identifiable roots,
was not unavoidable. It was the result of a course of events in
which domination-oriented Serbian nationalism led by Slobodan
Milosevic supplanted the previous communist ideology in Ser-
bia, the largest federal unit in the SFRY, and clashed with the
defensive nationalisms and state building aspirations of the
other peoples and federal units. The confluence of these events
with the end of the Cold War, and the attendant need for the
redefinition of the roles of the European Union and United
States in the period to follow, impacted upon the response of
the international community to the emerging crisis. The initial
steps taken proved to be slow, indecisive, and unresponsive to
the far reaching geopolitical changes that had taken place.
Despite differences in approach, the international commu-
nity was, for the most part, passive towards the dissolution of the
SFRY. While certainly not encouraging them, the international
community reluctantly tolerated the quest for independence of
the newly emerging states. Unfortunately, this passivity ex-
tended to the period in which the Serb-controlled former Yugo-
slav National Army moved against the new states. The lack of
clarity about the roles in the protection of peace and security in
Europe at the end of the Cold War left Milosevic's aggression
unopposed by an adequate response. Early in the crisis, the
United States was happy to go along with the assertion of Luxem-
bourg's Foreign Minister that the challenge of resolving matters
was the "hour of Europe." "We have no dog in this fight" was
James Baker's somewhat less famous, though erroneous, summa-
tion of the impact upon U.S. interests of the escalating crisis,
following his visit to Belgrade in 1990. With reason, this position
was subsequently widely seen as having been interpreted by
Milosevic as a "green light." Hence, while the United States
waited for Europe to resolve the trouble in its midst, the Euro-
pean Community, unprepared for this new role, preoccupied
with its internal affairs and divided by the divergent interests of
its member states, failed the test.
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While it can certainly be said that violations of the laws of
war occurred on all sides during the ensuing conflicts, the hor-
rendous atrocities committed by the Serbian forces associated
with ethnic cleansing propelled international humanitarian con-
cern to the forefront.3 At the time of the occupation of Vukovar,
Croatia in November 1991, the international community
watched with horror and disbelief as columns of refugees left
their homes in tears, victims of the deliberate and planned pol-
icy of "ethnic cleansing." These pictures and subsequent infor-
mation on the massacre of the wounded at the Vukovar hospital
simply did not fit into the optimistic image of the 1990s Europe
that had witnessed the fall of the Berlin Wall.
It was the pressure of world public opinion, viewers of the
media with global coverage bringing the reality of the horror to
millions of homes that were the catalyst for a response from the
international community. Given its earlier intervention in Iraq,
the U.S. Administration was not eager to get directly involved,
and Europe preferred recourse to multilateralism as well. The
fact that the end of the Cold War had brought a period of better
understanding between the permanent members of the Security
Council enabled the United Nations to become actively involved.
As a reaction to the gross violations of human rights and human-
itarian law resulting from the aggression against the Republic of
Croatia and continuing aggression on Bosnia and Herzegovina,
the institution of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the
human rights situation in former Yugoslavia was introduced in
1992.' The reports of the Special Rapporteur confirmed what
was widely suspected.5 Horrendous war crimes were being com-
mitted in a systematic manner. As a next step the Security Coun-
cil established a Commission of Experts to investigate alleged vi-
olations of humanitarian law in October 1992.6 The Commis-
sion of Experts received information from governments, but also
3. See Christopher C. Joyner, Enforcing Human Rights Standards in the Former Yugosla-
via: The Case for an International War Crimes Tribunal, 22 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y. 235,
236 (1994).
4. For an insider's description of the events preceding the establishment of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia ("ICTY') and the establish-
ment itself, see Ralph Zacklin, Bosnia and Beyond, 34 VA. J. INT'L L. 277, 277-81 (1994).
5. See M. Cherif. Bassiouni, Former Yugoslavia: Investigating Violations of International
Humanitarian Law and Establishing an International Criminal Tribunal, 18 FORDHAM INT'L
L.J. 1191, 1202 (1995).
6. Informal discussions within Security Council whether to name the body "Coin-
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carried out its own investigations. Although its mandate did not
include investigations for the purpose of prosecution of individ-
ual crimes, it was an obvious precursor to the establishment of
the Tribunal-should it be needed.
Continuing events proved that it was indeed needed. The
scale of atrocities committed and resultant human suffering in
Bosnia and Herzegovina during the winter of 1992-93 brought
the final push for the establishment of the ICTY. In February
1993, the Security Council unanimously adopted a resolution re-
questing the Secretary General to submit for its consideration a
report on the way in which to establish a tribunal, accompanied
by specific proposals.' At the time there was considerable doubt
and skepticism within the legal community, including among in-
ternational legal advisers' regarding this endeavor. Within less
than than 100 days, however, on May 25, the ICTY had come
into existence by virtue of the adoption of Security Council Reso-
lution 827 that accepted the Secretary General's report, includ-
ing the Tribunal's Statute. 9
The Tribunal was established under Chapter VII of the U.N.
Charter ("Charter") as an enforcement measure. The Security
Council recognized the existence of a threat to international
peace and security under Article 39 of the Charter, and decided
that, in terms of Articles 7(2) and 41, the establishment of a sub-
sidiary organ for the performance of judicial functions was
needed to maintain or restore international peace and secur-
ity.1" Because of its judicial nature, the Tribunal was required to
perform its functions independently of political considerations
and the control of the Security Council. Much was left to the
discretion of the future judges. The statute of the Tribunal con-
sists of just thirty-four articles, leaving it to the panel of judges to
elaborate the rules of procedure and evidence. The judges
themselves are selected in their individual capacity by the Gen-
eral Assembly. The statute authorizes the Tribunal to deal with
individuals responsible for four different categories of crimes:
mission" or "Committee" and whether its mandate would be to "investigate" or to "in-
quire," indicated differences between the Security Council members.
7. See ICTY Statute, supra note 1, at 2.
8. See Zacklin, supra note 4, at 278, 281.
9. See ICTY Statute, supra note 1, at 1.
10. Catherine Cisse, The International Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda:
Some Elements of Comparison, 7 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROS. 103, 106 (1997).
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grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, violations of
the laws and customs of war, crimes against humanity, and geno-
cide.
II. ICTY AS A LEGAL AND POLITICAL INSTITUTION
The establishment of the ICTY represented a breakthrough
in the development of international criminal law. For the first
time in history the implementation of international criminal law
was imposed on all sides to the conflict, avoiding the objection
of victor's justice. Importantly though, the implementation of
international criminal law was not accepted through the free
choice of all of the parties. While the Croatian Government and
the Muslims and Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina called for
and supported the establishment of the Tribunal, the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia and Bosnian Serbs opposed it." The
legal form of its establishment, through a Security Council reso-
lution passed pursuant to Chapter VII of the Charter, simply
meant that the Tribunal had been imposed on all sides and,
therefore, that for the countries concerned cooperation with
this Tribunal represented a binding obligation backed by the
sanction of the Security Council.
The establishment of the ICTY obviously implies a certain
limitation upon sovereignty. No country easily accepts such con-
ditions of its free will, except in very specific circumstances.' 2
The Tribunal's statute provides for its primacy over national ju-
risdiction, which allows for the takeover of an investigation
whenever the Tribunal's prosecutor finds it appropriate. The
traditional ne bis in idem principle also does not apply: if the
ICTY is unsatisfied with a national trial, then under certain con-
ditions it can repeat the trial against the same perpetrator for
the same offence. National authorities are bound to cooperate
with the Tribunal and comply with its orders, including the exe-
cution of its arrest warrants.
The use of Chapter VII for the establishment of the Tribu-
nal and its imposition upon the states concerned did not go un-
11. In UN Doc. A/48/170-s/25801 (1993), there is a letter dated May 19, 1993
from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to the U.N. Sec-
retary General.
12. See Justice Richard Goldstone, Conference Luncheon Address, 7 TRANSNAT'L L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 4 (1997)
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opposed. During the debate on Security Council Resolution
808, which established the Tribunal, Brazil and China expressed
concern that the interpretation of Security Council powers had
been over-stretched. Mexico presented an official report, chal-
lenging the Security Council's authority to act as it did. Subse-
quently, in the much-publicized Tadic case-the first trial for
war crimes after the Second World War-the Appeals Chamber
examined the legal basis of the establishment of the Tribunal,
upon a defense challenge. The Chamber found that the estab-
lishment of the ICTY fell within the powers of the Security Coun-
cil under Article 41 of the Charter.1"
The Tribunal's legal features are rather obvious. It is ajudi-
cial body that uses legal procedures to dispense justice according
to previously defined rules. But to get the full picture of the
Tribunal, its political features must be taken into account as well.
As Ralph Zacklin puts it, "[t]he Tribunal's background is polit-
ical; it has a history of politics driven by public opinion and lead-
ing to developments in law."1 4
The Tribunal was created due to the existence of a critical
mass of political will, for identifiable political reasons and its per-
formance produces political effects. Furthermore, in perform-
ing its legal tasks it relies upon the political support of the states
concerned and the Security Council. Finally, it has to make
political choices when selecting which cases to prosecute, which
is done by taking into account political realities.
An important impetus for the establishment of the ICTY was
a feeling of a moral guilt among the international community
resulting from the double failure to either prevent or stop the
massacre.'" As Louis Henkin puts it:
International law is generally the law of the lowest common
denominator of agreement among states. The nomination of
that dominator might be changed radically by some fortui-
tous event. Something can happen-as happened in Yugosla-
via-which will raise the denominator so that states are sub-
ject to international law and institutions what they might have
13. In re Dugko Tadic (The Prosecutor v. Dugko Tadic): Decision on the Defence
Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 1995 I.C.T.Y. No. IT-94-1-AR 72, re-
printed in 35 I.L.M. 32, at 45.
14. See Zacklin, supra note 4, at 277.
15. See Cisse, supra note 10, at 105.
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refused earlier. 
1 6
In fact the "raising of the common denominator" was been
made possible through the establishment of the ICTY-but its
jurisdiction was not agreed upon-which was imposed upon the
states arising from the former Yugoslavia from the Security
Council.
It is not an easy task to balance the sovereignty of states with
the efficiency of criminal law. The Tribunal's former prosecutor
Justice Louise Arbour admitted herself that the marriage be-
tween international law and criminal law is an unhappy one, in
which consensus, as a key feature of international law, has to be
supplemented in large part by force." This marriage, however,
was needed for a number of reasons and international and crim-
inal law were forced into it. The justification for the establish-
ment of the Tribunal was convincing. Firstly, it was prevention-
the establishment of the Tribunal should discourage possible
perpetrators of future violations and change the "climate of im-
punity." Secondly, individualization of guilt should distinguish
war criminals from the rest of their communities, and therefore,
by avoiding the perception of collective guilt, facilitate reconcili-
ation. Finally, the establishment of a reliable historical record.
This record was important for future generations, so as to avoid
dangerous misinterpretations and myths."8 Indirect benefits of
the Tribunal also included learning from the ICTY's experience,
and treating it as an experiment helpful for the establishment of
a permanent criminal court.
The commencement of the ICTY's proceedings with the
Tadic case-an awful sadist, but a politically marginal criminal-
has been a source of frustration to many. It raised the question
whether the ICTY was capable, and willing, to bring to justice
not only the marginal perpetrators, but also, the politically and
militarily most responsible, as was the case at Nuremberg. Many
16. See Louis Henkin, Conceptualizing Violence: Present and Future Developments in In-
ternational Law, 60 ALB. L. REV. 578 (1997).
17. Louise Arbour, Progress and Challenges in International CiminalJustice, 21 FORD-
HAM INT'L L.J. 531, 536 (1997).
18. The report of the first ICTY prosecutor, Judge Richard Goldstone, presents a
warning in this respect: "whenever I visit the former Yugoslavia, virtually every visit
starts with a history lesson. If I am lucky, it may begin in Second World War; if I am
unlucky, it may begin in the Fourteenth Century." See Goldstone, supra note 12, at 10.
So-called history lessons are being repeated by opposing sides simply because there is
no common, reliable history accepted by all.
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have perceived the political impact of the Tribunal as a double-
edged sword. Could the Tribunal turn into an impediment to a
negotiated peace settlement in Southeast Europe? Contrary to
the idealistic view that there is no peace without justice, there is
also a pragmatic alternative. Firstly, it may not be possible to
bring about a peace settlement in the former Yugoslavia if the
Tribunal is going forward with active prosecutions of the state
leaders of the belligerent parties. Secondly, even if the political
leadership changes, it may be impossible for the new govern-
ments to hand over former leaders and remain in power.
Namely, if the peace includes ICTY's ability to apprehend all
perpetrators of crimes, then at least for some members of the
leadership of the sides to the conflict, peace might not be such a
desirable idea.
The underlying dilemma is whether, at a certain point in
time, it is better to prosecute or to rehabilitate.19 Argentina, for
example, has chosen to increase stability by putting an end to
investigations concerning its civil war. South Africa established a
Truth and Reconciliation Commission, not a tribunal. The
countries that emerged from the former Yugoslavia did not
choose for themselves. The ICTY was chosen for them by the
Security Council. According to a recent account, the Tribunal
was widely perceived as an important public relations device and
a policy tool by the U.S. government.20 Changes in the situation
in southeast Europe brought about a policy change towards Pres-
ident Milosevic of Serbia. At one time, in Dayton 1995, his in-
dictment was thought to be harmful for the prospect of peace
talks, while later it seemingly became a useful tool to pressure
him and maintain public support for the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization's ("NATO") bombing campaign against Serbia in
spring 1999.
The political dimension of the Tribunal is most visible in
the Prosecutor's dilemma on case selection. In regard to this
issue, Justice Arbour, the former ICTY Prosecutor, has drawn at-
19. In this respect, the principles of justice and pragmatic political and security
interests might sometimes be pulling in different directions. For example, during the
process of peaceful reintegration of formally occupied Eastern Slavonia, Croatian au-
thorities were under strong pressure not to initiate criminal proceedings against the
local Serbian war criminals, exerted by the same international forces that brought the
ICTY into being.
20. See Michael Scharf, Indicted for War Crimes, WASH. POST, Oct. 3, 1999.
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tention to an important distinction between the ICTY and na-
tional courts:
An immediate distinction can be seen between the work of
these Tribunals and a domestic criminal justice system, be-
cause a domestic prosecutor is never really seriously called
upon to be selective in the prosecution of serious crimes.
Crimes are committed, they are reported, investigated,
charges are brought, and the prosecutors prosecute all major
crimes where the evidence permits.
By contrast, in the work of the international Tribunals, the
prosecutor has to be highly selective before committing re-
sources to investigate or prosecute, and must work in a man-
ner that can complement domestic legal systems. That is
what we have had to do.2 1
Each trial necessarily contains different dimensions. It is
the trial of a perpetrator of a crime, bringing justice to the vic-
tims and their families. Further, it contains a deterrent element,
because it shows that certain practices are unacceptable and will
be punished. This element is also precedent-setting and pre-
ventative. Finally, it brings to light the broader framework of the
crime, the role and indirect responsibility of the superiors and
political leadership. This dimension is very important, because
of the present and future image of the countries and groups
concerned.
Crimes are committed by individual perpetrators and not by
an ethnic group or a nation. Every crime, no matter the ethnic-
ity of the perpetrator, must be examined in accordance with the
available evidence and the applicable law. However, due to the
magnitude of the crimes committed, time constraints, and the
scarcity of other resources available to the Tribunal, it cannot
prosecute all of the numerous perpetrators of war crimes.
Rather, it has to carry out its work in a selective manner. How-
ever, if a selective approach is unavoidable, then the cases
brought before the Tribunal must at least be representative.
For political reasons, the cases must be representative in
terms of nationality of the victim and the perpetrator. This cer-
tainly does not imply that the prosecutor should equally dis-
tribute indictments among the three national groups. To have
21. See Arbour, supra note 17, at 534.
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credibility, the prosecutor's decisions on the selection of cases
must be based on the available evidence, and not on some no-
tion of moral equivalence among the parties.22 On the other
hand, it is the office of the prosecutor that directs investigations
and chooses priorities in collecting evidence.
For both moral and political reasons, and for the historical
record, these choices, which are the exercise of prosecutorial dis-
cretion, should reflect the extent and the level of involvement of
the various sides in the war crimes committed. Even an unin-
tended disregard for these elements in the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion leads to a distorted picture and handi-
caps the Tribunal in achieving its ends. In order to analyze the
present record of the Tribunal, we have used data on the indict-
ments and detainees from the sixth annual report of the Tribu-
nal submitted to the Security Council and the General Assembly
pursuant to Article 34 of the statute of the Tribunal. 23
The data indicates that, unfortunately, to date,
prosecutorial discretion has fallen short of its desired objectives.
The numbers speak for themselves and there is no particular
need to comment upon them. Some important shortcomings,
however, are not visible from the numbers alone. It is important
to note that, up to the present, nobody has been indicted for the
well-documented crimes targeted specifically against Bosnian
Croats. This deficiency seriously undermines the crucial objec-
tives of the Tribunal: justice, a truthful account of what took
place during the conflict, and ultimately, healing and reconcilia-
tion.
Cooperation with the Tribunal, in the sense of extradition,
represents a mixture between a curse and a blessing for the
country or the national group concerned. The more one coop-
erates, the more his citizens or fellow nationals are being tried,
the more negative media coverage one receives, and the more
negative the perception that is spread. It is not news for the me-
dia that the SFRY does not cooperate with the Tribunal. What
makes the news is the face of the individual Croat or Bosnian,
22. See Minna Schrag, The Yugoslav War Crimes Tribunal: An Interim Assessment, 7
TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15, 20-21 (1997).
23. See U.N. GAOR, 54th sess., U.N. Doc. A/2905 (1999) cited in International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, (visited Jan. 17, 2000) <http://
www.un.org/icty/rapportan/rapport6-e.htm> (on file with the Fordham International
Law Journal).
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Table One: Comparative Data on Indictments and Detainees of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia as of
August 1, 1999
(1) Percentage of crimes committed, indicted persons and
persons in custody, according to ethnicity
Ethnic Muslims/
Ethnic Serbs Ethnic Croats Bosniaks Total
Crimes Committed* 90% <10% 100%
Indictments** 47 14 2 63
% of total 75% 22% 3% 100%
Persons in custody 15 11 2 28
% of total 54% 39% 7% 100%
* These statistics are U.S. Central Intelligence Agency estimates as reported by
Roger Cohen, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 1995.
** Indictments that were dropped are not included.
(2) Percentage of indicted in custody
Ethnic Muslims/
Ethnic Serbs Ethnic Croats Bosniaks Total
Indicted* 47 14 2 63
In custody 15 11 2 28
Percentage 32% 79% 100% 44%
* Indictments that were dropped are not included.
facing accusations in the courtroom, shown on the television
screen. The historical record has already been influenced heav-
ily by the cases that were tried by the Tribunal. If 'victor's jus-
tice' was one extreme, then the present work of ICTY might be
perceived as the other. In Nuremberg, the Allies tried the Nazis,
exclusively. As long as the SFRY and the Bosnian Serbs do not
want to cooperate with ICTY, can the ICTY obliviously settle to
try exclusively Croats and Muslims? Would this case not be simi-
lar to a situation if only Allies were tried after World War II, be-
cause the Nazis refused to cooperate? Apprehensions of indict-
ees in Republika Srpska by the SFOR are slowly correcting this
initially absurd situation. However, what of the war criminals in
the SFRY? What about Mrksic, Sljivcanin, and Radic, who are
responsible for the massacre of wounded Croats in Vukovar, who
continue to live comfortably in SFRY? And, what about
Milosevic, himself?
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The ICTY does not formally recognize prosecutorial discre-
tion. It is obvious that, however, Milosevic, because of his re-
sponsibility for crimes in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina,
was the same war criminal at Dayton, when he was treated with
respect as a powerful negotiator, as he was in the midst of the
NATO bombing campaign when an indictment was issued
against him for his involvement in the crimes committed in Ko-
sovo. It is a matter of speculation whether political considera-
tions impacted upon the decisions of the prosecutor. Whatever
the case, further indictments against Mr. Milosevic for his partici-
pation in crimes committed in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzego-
vina would be very important for the historical record, for heal-
ing and reconciliation, and for the long term stability of south-
east Europe.
III. THE ROLE OF ICTY IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL ADJUDICATION
The history of international criminal law is closely related to
the development of international law on war crimes. Although,
theoretically, there is no reason why the body of international
crimes would not include any crime, primarily due to political
interests it has more or less overlapped with the body of war
crimes. The idea that limitations upon acceptable ways of con-
ducting war is exclusively European and relatively new, is quite
wrong.24 As early as the sixth century B.C., the Chinese warrior
Sun Tzu appealed for restrictions in the conduct of hostilities.
Manu includes them in his codification reflecting Hindu cus-
tomary law around 2000 B.C. Similarly, when the Persian king
Xerxes realized that the Greeks had killed his envoys, he re-
frained from retaliation against the Greek envoys that were in his
power, because he considered that what the Greeks had done
was against the laws and customs of all peoples.
International criminal law developed through the centuries
by the common acceptance of certain limitations upon the con-
duct of hostilities and through the establishment of individual
responsibility through multinational ad hoc courts created to
punish those responsible for atrocities. The evolution of the
24. For more details on the examples and literature, see Timothy L.H. McCor-
mack, Selective Reaction to Atrocity: War Crimes and the Development of International Criminal
Law, 60 ALB. L. REv. 681, 681-732 (1997).
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mechanisms for adjudication appears to have a recognizable
pattern. Starting from these trends we can develop a model
identifying certain stages, each representing a step forward in
broadening the scope of international jurisdiction over crimes
and their perpetrators. 25 This broadening can be understood as
moving from selectivity in designating the groups whose crimes
are being prosecuted and selecting conflicts in which the crimes
committed will be prosecuted, towards universality in the sense
of jurisdiction over all participants in the conflict and covering
all conflicts of the same sort. The stages are set out in the follow-
ing table:
Table Two: Evolution of International Adjudication
PERSONAL TEMPORAL ORIGIN OF
STAGES JURISDICTION JURISDICTION JURISDICTION EXAMPLES
I Conquered per- Ad-hoc the right of the Trial of Peter
petrators of victor von Hagenbach
crimes 1474; Nurern-
I _berg; Tokyo
II All perpetrators Ad-hoc Security Council Tribunal for the
of crimes during mandate Former Yugosla-
the conflict via; Tribunal for
Rwanda
III Perpetrators of Permanent Multilateral International
crimes covered agreement Criminal Court
by the agree-
ment
IV All perpetrators Permanent jus cogens ?
of crimes
The first stage of development starts with sporadic cases of
the establishment of ad hoc courts with international composi-
tion to try the defeated enemy for crimes committed during hos-
tilities that are universally perceived as such. The first such regis-
tered case seems to be the trial of a certain Peter von Hagenbach
in Breisach, Austria in 1474. Hagenbach was tried by an ad hoc
tribunal consisting of twenty-eight judges from the allied states
who defeated Hagenbach's followers. Hagenbach was convicted
of murder, rape, perjury, and other crimes against the "laws of
25. Another dimension of expansion is related to the broadening of the list of
crimes, however, this matter is beyond the scope of the present Essay.
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God and men" and as a punishment he was stripped of his
knighthood and sentenced to death.26 Conceptually, the Nu-
remberg trial was not much different. It also was multinational,
rather than international, and composed essentially of the four
victorious Allies. Its rules of procedure and evidence were only
rudimentary, with only eleven written rules, leaving the Nurem-
berg Tribunal a lot of maneuvering space, but also exposing it to
many doubts. For the purpose of our survey we can conclude
that both of these courts were established ad hoc, having jurisdic-
tion over perpetrators on the defeated side only, and therefore
sensitive to the objection of the imposition of victor's justice.
Victor's justice has been criticized from the moral, political,
and legal points of view. A model of an international tribunal
was argued for which would give equal treatment to the victors
and the defeated alike with respect to the prosecution of war
crimes. Those discussions in fact represented an academic prep-
aration for a new stage in the development of international crim-
inal adjudication, marked by the establishment of the ICTY and
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.27 These two
tribunals are of an ad hoc nature, established and imposed by
Security Council resolutions, having jurisdiction over all perpe-
trators of crimes during the conflict. In this respect, the tribu-
nals undoubtedly represent a breakthrough, putting all sides en-
gaged in a conflict in the same position with regard to the prose-
cution of war crimes committed. The question, however,
remains: why the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda only? For ex-
ample, when the same conflict between Hutus and Tutsis spilled
over from Rwanda to Burundi and Zaire (or the Democratic Re-
public of Congo) neither the jurisdiction of the tribunal was
broadened, nor was a new one established. The fact that the ad
hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda remain the
only ones, indicates selectivity in choosing conflicts upon which
the international community is capable of and willing to impose
the implementation of international criminal law. If it is practi-
cally, normatively, and politically feasible to create ad hoc tribu-
nals, then why does the establishment of a permanent court with
global jurisdiction remain a distant prospect?
26. For more information, see McCormack, supra note 24, at 689-90.
27. Statute for the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res 955, U.N.
SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453rd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994).
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The establishment of the ICC will represent the next step in
the evolution of international criminal adjudication, and will be
significant enough to mark a new phase. Until now, eighty-nine
countries have signed the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court 28 ("ICC Statute"). The process of ratification is
going rather slowly. The ICC Statute cannot enter into force un-
til it has been ratified by sixty states, while just four have done so
to date. The basis for the ICCjurisdiction is found in a multilat-
eral agreement. Once sufficient ratifications are deposited, a
permanent court with jurisdiction over all the perpetrators of
the crimes that are one way or another related to the countries
that signed the agreement will be established. According to the
ICC Statute, the ICC is of a complementary character. It is acti-
vated only when the national organs of the State party are un-
able or unwilling to prosecute crimes under international law. It
should be noted that the method of the establishment of its
mandate, that is, its contractual origin, fully respects the sover-
eign equality of all states.
The Court's treaty basis makes its jurisdiction dependent
upon the goodwill of states. Since, as we have previously indi-
cated, states are reluctant to reduce their sovereignty, the ICC
Statute adopted in Rome included many compromises between
the sovereignty of states and the efficiency of the ICC. One of
the results is that if and when the states agree to submit them-
selves to the jurisdiction of the court, then their practical coop-
eration in individual cases rests, more or less, upon their good-
will. There simply are no clear and effective sanctions for non-
cooperation provided in the ICC Statute. The linking of rela-
tively undefined sanctions to the Security Council, privileges Se-
curity Council members, particularly the aristocratic "upper
house" members who possess the power of veto.
With regard to the treaty character of the Court, a quite le-
gitimate question arises as to why an international criminal juris-
diction can be imposed upon some states-such as the states
that have arisen following the disintegration of the former Yugo-
slavia and Rwanda-but not upon others. A principled answer
that would be in line with the sovereign equality of states simply
28. UNITED NATIONS, DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE OF PLENIPOTENTARIES ON THE ESTAB-
LISHMENT OF AN INT'L CRIMINAL COURT, ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.183/9 (1998) (adopted by United Nations onJuly 17, 1998).
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does not exist. Indeed, the answer is not based upon a matter of
-principle, but rather on the international division of power.
The pattern of a further qualitative movement, that is, a new
stage in the development of international criminal adjudication
that would finally fulfill the criteria of universality, justice, and
equality (the equal treatment of all offenders in every conflict),
is already clear. Its practical realization is unclear, however, not
just in time, but whether we shall arrive at it at all. If we are
facing the emergence of global civilization, if we speak about
world climate and world trade, then perhaps we are approaching
a- "world law" replacing contract-based international law in some
areas. If, according to the newly emerged doctrine of humanita-
rian intervention, countries can be bombed without their con-
sent, then why could not criminals be tried without the consent
of their governments? In order to achieve its full potential, the
ICC should be a permanent, independent, judicial organ with its
jurisdiction covering all international criminal acts. The
mandatory nature of international criminal law and the jurisdic-
tion of the ICC should be of a universal and cogent nature, and
independent of its acceptance by states. The selection of cases
should be part of its inherent jurisdiction, independent of the
Security Council, or any other body.
It is clear which parties shall have diverging interests when it
comes to the establishment of this idealistic world juridical insti-
tution, fully respecting the principles of universality and equal-
ity. On the one side there are the supporters of the inviolability
of state sovereignty and the current "controllers" of the interna-
tional order-in particular the permanent members of the Se-
curity Council. On the other side are the idealists, liberal legal
theorists, and non-governmental organizations (or "NGOs")
whose aim is the protection of human rights. Whilst at this time
the balance appears to be a completely uneven, the idealists
may, with time, given the spread of globalization, free media,
and the unacceptability of double standards, attract the neces-
sary critical level of support. In this prospect, the International
Coalition for the ICC, uniting almost a hundred NGOs that ac-
tively support its establishment, might represent an important
nucleus.
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IV. ICTY: A PRELIMINARY EVALUATION
It is easy to overestimate, but also to underestimate the re-
sults of the ICTY to date. In order to try to avoid personal expec-
tations about the development of international criminal law in-,
fluencing our judgement, the success, or the lack of it, should be
carefully assessed by analyzing the level of the achievement of
goals for which the ICTY was established. In this respect, it is
important to evaluate to what extent the Tribunal has contrib-
uted: ending and preventing further war crimes, altering the cli-
mate of impunity, assisting in the individualization of guilt,
preventing the creation of negative stereotypes, and establishing
a reliable historical record concerning the conflict. Finally, and
perhaps most importantly: what is the ICTY's experimental
value and its contribution to the further development of interna-
tional criminal law?
Unfortunately, the establishment of the Tribunal neither
stopped, nor prevented future war crimes. They continued to be
committed in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and after the escalation
of a new conflict-this time in Kosovo-ethnic cleansing has
been used as a tool once again. Perhaps it was the impunity of
the major indicted Bosnian Serb war criminals-Karadzic and
Mladic, the Croatian Serb, Martic, and all of the other indictees
from SFRY-that sent the wrong message. President Milosevic of
Serbia-the key figure and the most responsible for the drama
in southeast Europe-was only indicted when NATO air strikes
against SFRY were already in progress.
Evidently, prevention failed with respect to the conflict and
the area for which the Tribunal has been established. But what
of the global aim of general prevention, that is, the influence
upon behavior in possible future conflicts around the world?
There is no clear answer, but it seems that it depends upon
whether people like Karadzic, Mladic, Martic, and Milosevic as
well, are successfully brought to justice. It is also important to
note that the ICTY was established ex post facto when the conflict
was already going on and many crimes had already been com-
mitted, while, of course, the full preventive effect can only be
expected from a permanent court, such as the ICC.
It is probably too early for a final say on the effects of the
work of the Tribunal upon the individualization of guilt for the
war crimes committed, and toward the end of avoiding the per-
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ception of collective guilt and facilitating reconciliation. The re-
fusal of cooperation by the Bosnian Serbs and the SFRY, how-
ever, is discouraging in this respect. The unwillingness of the
SFRY to cooperate with the ICTY, and its continued harboring of
indictees charged with the most grievous war crimes is of serious
concern to Croatia since these acts are in blatant disregard of
international law, the ICTY, and the U.N. Security Council. An
even greater concern stems from the fact that such a lack of co-
operation is a function of the SFRY's unwillingness to accept its
responsibility for the war in southeast Europe. The climate of
impunity encouraged further breaches of international humani-
tarian law by the SFRY armed forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina
and Kosovo.29 The process of reconciliation hinges upon bring-
ing people like Sljivcanin, Mrksic, Radic or Martic, Karadzic and
Milosevic, and others to justice.
On the matter of the historical record, the results are, up
until now, ambiguous. There is a serious problem of un-
representation in the indictments presented compared to the
breadth and level of involvement of different national groups in
the conflict. The Bosnian Croats are over-represented as perpe-
trators, and underrepresented as targets. The lack of efficiency
in bringing before the Tribunal high level Bosnian Serbs or any
perpetrators from the SFRY adds to the distorted picture.
The ICTY represents a crucial test of our readiness for the
establishment of a permanent international criminal court of
wider jurisdiction. What are its results? The ICTY certainly rep-
resents a great improvement from the Nuremberg and Tokyo
practice of victor's justice. Selectivity stemming from the fact
that it has been imposed by the Security Council as the result of
a particular situation and only upon the countries concerned,
casts a shadow upon the principle of the sovereign equality of all
states.
At the same time, the merits of the ICTY and the Tribunal
for Rwanda that followed as a direct consequence of the ICTY
are numerous. The practice of the Tribunal already is, and will
continue to be, very important for the interpretation of interna-
tional humanitarian law. International law, mostly a product of
multilateral negotiations, is frequently articulated in a highly ab-
29. See INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, ARTICULATING INTERESTS IN A
CHANGING WORLD: CROATIA AT UN HEADQUARTERS 1998 62 (Ivan Simonovic ed. 1999).
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stract manner, often ambiguously and obscurely. ° The ICTY's
interpretation of command responsibility and the responsibility
of political leaders, for example, will have important impact not
only as a new subject of adjudication, but could also have signifi-
cant repercussions upon future conduct with a preventive effect.
In the sense of prevention, the narrowing of the distinction be-
tween international and internal armed conflict will surely have
a positive effect, restricting unacceptable behavior in wars. Sys-
tematic rape has been added to the list of war crimes through
the practice of the Tribunal.3" The recognition of a new gender
related crime-that of rape and the incitement to rape that has
been used to achieve political goals, such as ethnic cleansing-is
new and important. Finally, the Tribunal raised considerable ac-
ademic and professional interest in humanitarian law. Interna-
tional humanitarian law courses have received new life in law
schools and the number of articles dealing with humanitarian
law in law journals has grown exponentially, which all contrib-
uted to the positive climate for the establishment of the ICC.
The ICTY, however, ran into, and warned us about, some
important problems. The ICTY relies heavily-just as any future
international criminal court will-upon the cooperation of the
countries concerned. 2 Justice Arbour is right when she claims
that it is vital for any international tribunal to gain trust and re-
spect. While on a national level prosecutors and courts are pres-
sured to be unbiased and fair, on an international level they
have to prove as much. Although acceptance is never universal,
it must be sufficient to permit the easy functioning of the courts
without recourse to coercion.
The Tribunal managed to achieve what it did thanks to the
cooperation of Croats and Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina
and the Government of Croatia. If they had decided not to co-
operate, given the position of the Bosnian Serbs and the SFRY-
which is not beyond political logic-then the Tribunal would
have been stillborn. Therefore, finding a way to ensure the co-
operation of SFRY and Bosnian Serbs with the Tribunal is cru-
30. WJ. Fenrick, International Humanitarian Law and Criminal Trials, 7 TRANSNAT'L
L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 23, 43 (1997).
31. See Goldstone, supra note 12, at 3.
32. SeeJelena Pejic, The Tribunal and the ICC: Do Precedents Matter?, 60 ALB. L. REV.
841, 860 (1997).
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cial. 3 If the Tribunal, which has been created and supported by
the mighty enforcement powers of the Security Council, is not
efficient, then how can we expect efficiency from the ICC, which
shall be based upon the acceptance of the parties of a multilat-
eral treaty?
Our final evaluation is that up to the present, the ICTY has
been partially successful in many respects. The crucial question,
however, is whether in its future development international adju-
dication can overcome a selective approach, incompatible with
the principle of sovereign equality of states. This shall be re-
flected from the perspective of a permanent criminal court, if it
treats all states equally. A reduction of sovereignty caused by
globalization and its reflection on the increased international
authority to punish crimes committed is not necessarily a prob-
lem itself, as long as it affects all the states equally. Within the
principle of the sovereign equality of states-vital for the regula-
tion of international relations-the accent might shift from sov-
ereignty to equality. If, however, we want sovereignty to mean
less, then it is vital not to forget about equality. Without equality
receiving due consideration, we will face new divisions and con-
flicts, instead of increased global security and stability.
33. The general, if not the practical, support of the present government of Repub-
lika Srpska for the Tribunal and the positive attitude of some opposition leaders in the
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is encouraging in this respect.
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